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I now have an addendum prepared by
Gardner Cromwell, professor at the Montann. School of Law.
Mr. President, I ask urumlmous con-

sent that my insertion under date of
September 17, 19'14, beginning on page
816725 and concluding on page 816'128
be reinserted in the RECORD in ita original
form and thnt th!s addendum be printed
ln

~SeQUenee.

There being no bjectlon, the material
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:

PoWEll

Oll' Omma!:sa To z - c B .t.N11 TIIY A
PBKsmi:NT Arn:R Bll Roll RaltJNED; AND

PoWEll To

Co~

• TJwu. ow AN IMBzG'D'N IN ONE S.EIIIUON AND
C.t.&UED 0VJ:& Ilno .t. SI.TIISEQUENT S>:sfiiON

:PEACRKJ:NT

OP CO!fi!OIU!I!8

~OWER
OP CONGRESS TO IMPEA~
AND TRY A PRESIDENT AFTER HE
HAS RESIGNED; AND POWER TO
CONTINUE A TRIAL OF AN IMPEACHMENT BEGUN IN ONE SESSION AND CARRIED OVER INTO A
SUBSEQUENT SESSION OF CONGRESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
September 17, 1974, I Inserted in the
REcoRD a memorandum on Questions
dealing with the power of the Congress
to Impeach and try a President after he
has resigned and the question of continuing a trial of an impeachment begun in one session and carried on into a
subsequent session of Congress. The
memorandum was prepared by the
School of Law of the University of Montana.

Mr. MI.N1P'tJ!:1,D J!r. l'restdent, on August
4, 1974, durtng the l.mpea.chment proceedings In th& House of Representatives, I
requested the very a.ble and cU8t1D!{Ulshed
law faculty a.t t.be Unlveral.ty of Monta.nn
School of Law, Ulraugh Its dea.n, Robert E.
Sullivan, to cons~r and provide me and the
Senate wiUJ. acl.vlce and counael concerning
two COL\.StltuUow>.l queetlona, whloh at UJ.at
time COil!rontcd the Scnate and the Nation.. One question dealt with the power o!
Congrcas to Impeach e.nd try a Presl~ent
after he ha. !'eSigned. a.n<1 Ule other related
to e. oon\lnuatlon of a trial or an Impeachmen t begun 1n one llCMion and C&l'rled over
1ntQ a subsequent eeesion of Congreaa.
Dean Sulllva.n responded to my request
and hM eubmtttcd a memorandum prt?pared
\Ulder ~ho cll:rectlon ol Prot. Gardner Cromwell of the Uulverel~y of Montana School
of Law.
WhUe the overrtding b.•;ue ot Impeachment proceed.lnp hM been rendered moot
by UJ.e accept.&nce by the Houae or Representatives of the report or Ita Committee on
th& Judlcle.ry, It ls my judgment that thE>
work product of this legnl rese1lrch endeavor
by the Unlvemlty of Montana Is of slgnlflcance and llhoUld be included In the public
reoord. In pul'Btii&DCe of that objective, also,
1 have forwanled. a oopy o1 Ule memorandum
to Senator HowAIUl C.t.NNON', cba.lrman of
the Cornmltteo on Rules and AdmlnlatratlOD, Mll::l.llg that he review tlle conclusions
ot thJa memonnd.um to doMrm.ine w1lether
any c:bangc:oa In SeaaM rules might be suggested In vtew ot the point& considered.
Moreover, to enable the full Senate, and
others interested in theso Issues, to havo
the ben efit o f these views, I ask unanimous
cone.ent that the memorandum be printed
at thls point In the R.Ecoan, aa well a.s a
letter which I have received !rom Dean
Robert E. Bulllvan of the School of Law.
University ol Montana under date of
Augus t Zl , 1974.
There being no objection, the !E>tter and
memorandum were ordered to be printed
In the RJJCOIID, 11:1 foDowu:
'11Niv!:R.trrTT OP Mo:STA N A,
Mu.roula, Mcmt., Augu~t 23, 1974

Ron. MDD: li4ANSrrl:LD,
Senate JlfStm'i'J IAG4a,

S~rnAte

Of!lce Build-

In", Wa.shfngton, D.C

In responso to
your request of Augul!t 'J', I am enclosing a
memorandum by Profea.:Jr Gardner Cromwell of ou r law fa.culty. As you may l<now,
Prof~ eromwun te&cbea Constitutional
Law and bas been a member of our law tacnlty since 195'1. Be pract1ced tor a time a1ter
graduation from law achool a.nd bas \he reputation oi an acoompllahed legal acholar and
a hard-nosed reall.s~.
All tbe memoran<tam tnmcatee, there are
no dotl:nltlve a.DII'!I'elll to the questions prt-DEAR SENATOa J.l.t.NSJ'IELD:
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, seated. Souroo material Is not extensive, but
there Is suffi<:ient basis to state conclusions
on the bast.. or probabUitle.s--=ncluslons
that rellect what a court would do I! the
questions were presen ted tor decision.
I appreciate the opportunity to submit
this memorandum to you. It enables us to
reciprocate 1n a small way for your exten.sl ve
and coutlnumg efforts to assiSt the University of Montana.
Best personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
E . SULIJVAN,
Dean,SchoolofLaw.

ROBERT

CONSTrTUTION.U. RF.SPONSIBILITY OF CONGRESS

To Pu'astTE IMPEACHME!'.'T AND TlUAL REMEDIES IN A PaOCEIWlNO ONCE COMMENCED OR
AFTER A PRESIDENT RESIGNS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the Congress has power to Impeach and t7)' a President after he has
reslg'nlld.
n. Whether ~he Sen<ate has power to continue the trial or an Impeachment begun In
one Session of Congress Into the next Session.
CONCLUSIONS

I . Probably
II. Probably not.
Prellml.nary Question: Whether determinations of these questions are subject to Judicial review.
Conclu.sion : Probably.
The prellml.nary question raises the Issue
of the JustlclabUity or so-called "political
questions." Or, as the Supreme Court put It,
In Baker v. CaTT, 369 U .8. 166, 210 ( 1961) :
"The nonJustlclabUity of a political question 1s prl.mar1Jy a function of the separation
of powers." This memorandum approaches
the queRtlons presented from the viewpoint
of the lawyer, not tha.t of politician or historian, so most of the ma.terlals cited will be
"leg<al." Because the questions presented are
unusual (I! not unique), there 18 not much
legal authority a.va!lable.
The Baker deolslon culled criteria from
other ca.'!e8 (the Court called them "common
characteristics") for Identifying cases InvolvIng political questions. At p . 217 of 369 U .S .,
It listed these ·
(1) A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment or the Issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) A lack or judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving It;
(S) The lmpOSBibUity or deciding without
an Initial policy determination or 11 kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
(4) The lmposslbUlty or a court's undertaking Independent resolution without expressing lack or the respect due coordinate
branches of government:
(5) An unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already
made;
(6) The potentiality of embarrassment
from multl.ta.rlous pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Thereafter, in Powell v . McCormack, 395
U .S. 486 (1969). the Court applied the Baker
criteria to Adam Clayton Powell's declaratory
judgment suit claiming that the House of the
90th Congress had unconstitutionally refused to seat him. Because the United Sbates
District Court had dismiSsed Powell's petition •·tor want or jurisdiction of the subject
matter," the Supreme Court considered the
question of justlficlablllty. Particularly, the
Court detennined the "textually demonstrable commitment" and the scope or that commitment. The constitutional text Involved
was that portion or Article I, § 6, which makes
the House of Representatives "the Judge o!
the QU61lftcatlons of Its own Members."
It ts suf!lclent for the purposes of this
memorandum to record that the Supreme
Court decided that It had the power to

sepamtely construe that prov~l.on and to
conclude tbat the provision "18 at most 'a.
textually demon.strable commitment' to Congress to judge the quallfication.s expressly
set forth In the Constltutlon. Therefore, the
. . • doctrine does not ba.r Federal courts
from adjudicating petitioner's claims." (Emphasis added.) (395 U.S. at 546 )
Most recently, the Supreme Court assumed
jurisdlctlont.n U.S. v . Nixon, (No 73- 1766), 42
L.W . 5237 (7/ 2<l/74). On appeal was the Di.strlct .Judge's order to the President to produce "certain tapes, memoz-anda, papers,
trani'Crlpte, or other writings" allegedly relevant to criminal proceedings brought by the
Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court upheld that order and the Dl.strlct Judge's
ruling that the judiciary, not the President,
was the final arbIter of a claim of executlve
privilege. The Court rejected the Pre.sldent's
claim that the doctrine of separation of
powers prevented judicial review or a President's determination that the privilege appUed. Espeotally relevant to this heading Is
the following language:
"In the performance of assigned constitutional duties. each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the Interpretati on of Its powers by
any branch Is due great respect from the
others. The Pres ident's counsel, 1!1.8 we have
noted, reads the Constitution as providing
an abSOlute privilege of confidentiality for
all presldenblal communications. Many decislon.s of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaf!lrmed the holding of Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that 'tt Is emphatically the prov ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' Id.,
at 177." (Emphasis added.) 42 L .W . at 5243.)

One more decision must be dlscus.sed under
this heading, U.S . v . Smith, 266 u .s . 6 ( 1931),
concerned the application of certain Senate
rules to action by the Pre9ldent. The facts
were these : The President had transmitted
to the Senate the nomination of Smith to
the F .P .O. The ~ate conllrmea the nomination, ordered that the resolution of confirmation be forwarded to the President, and adjourned (!rom December 20 to January 5 )
all on the same day. On December 22, the
Secretary of the Senate notified the Prescient
ol the confirmation, the President commls•loned S mit.h and named him chairman, and
Smith took the oath and began work.
On January 5 . when the Senate returned,
a motion to reconsider the confirmation of
Smith wu properly made under SeiUI/te rules.
It paased, as did o. motion to ask the President to return the original resolution of
confirmation. The President was not11l.ed. He
reruRed to accede to the request on the
ground that Smith had been properly appointed. Thereafter, the Sena.te asked the
dlstrtct attorney of the District of Columbia
to bring ~ quo warranto proceeding.
The Supreme Court stated that the sole
question was one or law: Old the Senate
have the power it asserted? The answer to
the question, the Court said, "depends primarily upon the applicable Senate rules."
(286 U.S. at SO. ) The Court made plain that
the questton concerned construction of the
rules, not their constitutionality, clearly recognizing that It had no concern with "wisdom or folly," only power. The significance
of the Smith dectslon ·to this heading 18 emphased In this quotation:
"As the construction to be given to the
rules affects pcrson1 other than members of
the Senate, the question presented is of necessity a JUdicial one." • (Emphasis added.)
(286 U.S. at 33.)
'
This position is significant, too, to a matter considered under the second question
presented- present "Senate rules and their
relation to Impeachment. In the Smith opinion, following the language quoted. above,
the Court stated that It "must give great

weight to the Sene.te's present construction
or Its own rules," but that tt was not precluded from mak.ing its own Interpretation
of them.
• A related view was expressed by the
court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Nelson v. U.S., 208 F.2d 505,
513 (1953), cert. den. 346 US. 827 (1953) :
"Though 11 court oan no more enJoin a congreoolonal committee from making an unconstitutional search and seizure than It
can enjoin Congress from pasalng au unconstitutional blll [citing Hearst v. Black,
87 F.2d 68 (1936)}, a court does have -the
power and duty to deny legal elfect to either
In an action before lt." A similar statement
ami application appears In Fischler t>. McCarthy, 117 P . Supp. 643 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.
1954), ajJ' d . 216 F.2d 164 (1954) .
Addendum: Somewhat related to the preliminary question 18 another posed by Raoul
Berger In IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU'TIONAL PROBLEMS (Harvard, 1973).
Chapter ni, entitled ''Judicial Review," refers to some or the matters cilscusaed under this heading, Including PoweU v. McCormack. Berger recognized that "!rom
Story onward," (Including Prof. Herbert
Wechsler), the view has been that the Senate "has the last word." But, taking account of constitutional gulil'antees o! tncilvldual freedoms, tnter alia, he wrote:
"Constitutional limits, as Powell v. McCormack again reminds us, are subject to
judicial enforcement; and I would urge
that judlctal review of impeachment Is required to protect the other branches from
Congress' arbitrary will." (Emphasis added.)
(Berger, IMPEACHMENT, p. 119.)
Irving Brant, IMPEACHMENT : TRIALS
AND ERRORS (Knopf, 1973) presents a
different argument [pp. 182-1971 that, I!
Impeachment In fact amounte to a bUl of
attainder, the judiciary has power to act.
Bat es, Book Review [Berger and Brant
books on IMPEACHMENT, 25 Stan. L .
Rev. 908, 925 (1973) states: " Berger a.nci
Brant have, by their analyses, considerably
undermlnd the traditional view that judicial review or Impeachments Is unavallable."
. . . These authors, almost alone among
constit utional schola.rs, have developed arguments !or Judicial review that the Oourt
might adopt."
On the other hand, W . W. WUloughby (3
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 01" THE
UNITED STATES, p. 1651, 1929) a.sserted
flatly : "It Is scarcely necesaary to say that
the proceedings and determinations of tl"le
Senate when sitting a.s a court of Impeachm ent are notsulbject to review In any other
court." Broderick, Cttfzens' Gutde to Impeachment of a Prestdent .· Problem Areas,
23 Cath U. L . Rev. 205, 237 (1973) makes
the same "MBUmption," but t!\kes account
or Berger's contrary view.
DISCUSSION'

I. Whether the Congress has power to
impeach and try a President after he has
resigned.
There l.s very little precedent or discussion avallable. The Associated Pre.ss wire
carried au item (Spokane, Washington,
Spokesman-Review. Sunday, August 11,
1974, p . 3, col. 7) quoting an ACLU demand
for Impeachment despite resignation, based
on the 1676 Impeachment of ex-Secreta.ry
of War Belknap.
In the most recent of his two timely books
[Executive Prlvllege: A Oonstltutlonal Myth
(Harvard 1974) ], Raoul Berger referred to
the Belknap situation. In discussing Preel·
dent Andrew Jackson's refusal to furnish
certain material at the request of Congress.
Berger wrote :
" . .. Jackson was clearly wrong, unless we
are to assume that the power to tnvesttgate
executive conduct 1s cut off by termination
of official service." (Emphasis added.) (Berger, ,Executive Privilege, p. 182.)
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a jud.Jclal body." His rea.oou for making the>
L>Sertlon, however, appeo.ra renl\led by the
next sentence which suggest!! that the Sena w has "at least a moral o bllgn tlon ' t o npply
j udicial procedures.
In nn extensive article entitled Federal
I mpeach ments, 64 U. Penn. L . Rev. 651 {1916)
r epri nted 1n Treat!Be cited aupra, Simpson
poses the quest ion (pp. 667--676): wrn what
ca pacity does the Senate sit upon the trial o!
nn lmpoachment?" He answers the question,
after co ns ideration or his to rical ;>rccedent,
thus· "The Senate, then being a court, or
proceedi n g a3 iJ it w ere , ••• ." (Emphasis
added l (p . 674.) Much of the te n pages devoted to d iscussion o! the question relates to
the man ner 1n which the Senators, In Impeachment trials, have dcnom!na.tcd t he Senate--o.a " court" or as " high co urt of lmprechment ." But t h e more telling precedent
ls this (from p . 668 ): "The matter came up
d urin g the lmpeachement of Presiden t J ohnson. It Is said ln Hinds' Prececten ts of the
Ilouae of R epresc n tati z:es [Vol. 3, par. 2057
(1907) l :
"'In 1868, a fte r mature consid e r ation , the
Sena te d ecid ed t h at It sat ! or Impeac hmen t
t r lnls 1\8 t h e Se n at.e nnd not as a court . ..•
A n amtl<lt y le~ t t h e Chlet Justice might hrw e
11 vote s cern" to hrwe led the Se nn te t o drop
the word., "lllgh Court o! I m p eachmen t'
! rom Its ru les.' "
It Ia wo r t h obser ving U1a t the use o r
&uch phrases as " Htgh Court or Impeachm ent" may Ignore t he historical fact tha t
t h e Hou se a! Lords has performed both
l<'glsla.tlve and judicial fu n ctions. To the
very recent past: Press reports or proposals
to change t h e Senate Rules to deprive t h e
Chief J ustice o! a vote do no t affect the
anal ysis wh ich follows.)
On sever a l occasions, the Supreme Court
ha.-. treated thl' q uestion o! the effect o! adjournment a! the Congress or t he House.
There have been t wo subjects lnvolved- (1)
the extent o r the power to punish for contemp t , a n d (2) the veto p o wer or the
Preside nt.
( 1) The e arliest ca~e wa.s Ander son t:',
Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204 (1821). There, the qu estion wa.s t he extent of the power of Congr!llls
to lmprl.son for contempt. The Supr eme
Court ruled that t h e duration o r Imprison ment was set by the life of the Congt'('SS.
For p urpoaes o! t his head ing, th e f ollowing
langunge IS slgnit1cant :
" . . . althou gh the legislati ve po..,er continu es pnpetual, the legislati l.'e body cca.ses

September 28, 1!l'n

tlmac" In Acts or Cong re~. 'P'or eumple : 2
1 provide~: ~l'he TUesday nt'xt aftt-•
In November, 1n nery even
•
t. ~ n hlt.<h~d ar t h(' d A\ !or
v.. W Bellr.L....p, and the SenaWI ruled
the election, In each o! the States and Ter'
ha.d n t I06t jLll'1lidlctlon by virtue
ritories o! the Unlted States, of Repre. ntaBe knAp a rest nat.lon', 3 W W. Wllloughtlves and Delegates to the Ccmgre•s commen 1
c rut tuCionaZ LaU' of the United
1ng on the 3d day of January next there1 H9 (New Y rk 1929
after . .. ," {Empha..~ls a.dded ) The pro\ Is ion
t r as It oc the r~feren e to W 1!or adjournment, 2 U .S .C. § 198, recogul~ cs
Dut, r r U e purposes
that eneh Congress ende at t he end or an
It Is Imp rtnnt to rceven-numbered yco.r.
lNO. 5) to Ul w nough(2) The "pocket veto" decl.slons mnke clea r
t upon five
parate octhat the adjournment o! a Con~css ends It-S
1 peac n
t proc dl s again t
legislative l!fe. The question was ex ti'U.I\CIY
f t1 r 1 j dge wero dr ppcd by the Hou e
considered In The Pocket Veto Cas<' ( O A·a11. t e It wa.« not ed tha ea h had resigned.
nogan Inlfllms tl . U .<; ) , 279 US. 655 (1921!) .
B l.kn p 11.as a ulttcd. A Trl'
on FedAt !.•sue there was that part or the Con.,titu eral Impeachments S~mpson (Scholarly
tlon whic h reeds a.s follows :
Rc urc
Inc. 1973: first printed 1916)
Art. I , I 7, cl. :l: " . .. U &ny BUI .sll ,\11 not
• oz.talns ( p - 3 205) an abridgement o!
be returned by the Pre.sldent within ten Da.ys
the Belknap lmpe chm('nt trial, taken from
(Sundays excepted) after It shnll hn ve been
"Proccedlngs of the Senate sitting !or the
presented to him, the Same sbnll be a Lnw,
trial ot Wt,uam w. Belknap, 9 ( 1876) ."
In like Manner as II he had signed It, tulle 5
It con ude with this sentence: 'He wo.s
t h e Congress by thelt Adjournment pr.,vl·n t
acqu ted upon th ground that he had reIts Return, In which Case It shall n ot lJc a
lil 1 ed his o ce
Secretary or \\'ar, and
La w."
Ills r
nat on b d been accepted by tho
Th e Co urt dC<'Ided that the word " ocl jou•u 1 r •Ide• n co1 ple of hours before t.lle net ual
m c n t," 1\S us~d In that provision,
110t
adopLiou r t.n articles o! irup~l\rl&ment by
limited to final adjournment. But the opl ulou
Rpeclfiea the effect ot such ftnal adjounmu•ut.
tho llmu;c ·· 1 lrnp on Troail~e. p 20" )
Urnnt Impea hn ent, ~upra. treat., of th~
The Court etated that It was conceded "that
the President Is neceGoarlly preventf'd f rom
Belknap trial In Cha.ptcr VIII. He rrport.•
ret u rnlug a but by a 1\nal Adjournment or 1he
that 37 senntors vot.ed for comlctlou (4
Congress, since 3UI'h. aajournment terminat e.!
short or the two-thirds ne~eJSru"y) nnd 25
the
legislative erlrtence of thl' Contor acquit al Twenty-two• or the latter
gress . . ." (Emphasis added.) (2 70 U S.
number ga e aa their reason that the Senate
at 68 1 l And the Court co ncluded :
h d no jurisdiction over a civil officer who
" • .. tt !ollowa, In our opinion, . . . t h a t,
resigned before he 11>as Impeached
no return can be made to the House when It
l''lnally, und er thiS heading, 1t Is ernpha 1s rtot In 9e35lon as a collective bodv a n d It ~
~l~ed th:'lt the last clause of Art I f 3, promembers dispersed." (279 U.S . at 683.)
lldes n t only !or removal from office as a
The opinion also considered at pp. ~8 .5Judgment ln a ca:;e of Impeachment, but per
690 a.n abortive att..mpt by the Senate m
mlts "dlsquallflcat on to bold and enjoy any
1868
to provide for return of bills by t he
omco or honor, -rru t or Profit under tho
President when Congress was not In ses.~lo n .
United States" Be er's footn tc No. 114 (p.
The elltenslve footnote reproduction or Sen182), referred to above, cites Instances o! reate debate sbaws the opinion of some &>nquc.su by Secretary ot the Treasury Wolcott
a.tors
that the Beoa.te has no life after ad( 1800) and Vice President Calhoun (1 826) to
journment.)
the House to investigate their respectl\c p erThe Pockc t Veto Ca." ' was rel!ed on 1a
iol'DlADoes In olfice ~!nee vacated Then apWrigh. t V . U .S., 302 U.S. 583 (1937) , t o df•pears this eenten e . ' And, II thr derellctlous
termtne that a "temporary recess" take n by
warrant, lmpc hm nt can follow nod result
one House during a ec~ lon o! Con r;re'IS v ns
1n dlllQua llllcaUon to hold otll e'
n ot " adjournme n t ." But the Court emphnII Whether the Senate bas pow('r to conslzed the bases of the earlier decision .
t inue the tnal o! ar Impeachment begun In
one Se l<'n of Con r~SI! Into the nel!t SesThe factual dltrerenoe between the P a<·/.:l• t
Gion
Veto Ca.se a n d the Wright case has re<'clvr d
'l'he only ftat answ~r appears In "Jetrer- to cxtst on th e moment of Its ad.journmcnt contempol'l\.r}' empha8ls. The Great Fnlls
eon ft Manual.' reproduced In R ule5 a nd or periodic al dissolution." (Emphasis added )
Tribun e (Thlll11<lay, August 15, 1074, p 2.
Manunl United States S enate lfl?3 t!11rd Con col. 7) reported that the United State~ C <>tlrL
( 6 Wheat , at 231.)
~. 1st l!eS31on-&na.te Doc. No. 93-1);
or
Appeals (Dist. Col.) ha.d am rmed n Dl•That conclu.slo n was reamrmed In Mar"Ooo t1nuance An Impeachment Is not d l.s- shall v . Gorcton, 243 U .S . 621, 6-12 (1910 ) .
trict Court bold1ng that Presiden t Kilt 1,
continued by the dissolution of Parliament,
Both or those declsio n.s are cite d In sup- " pocket-veto' o! the Family PracUee o ! ll1<·d but may be r umcd by the new Parliament pert o r a footnote s tat eme nt appearing In lc1ne Act 1n 1970 could not stand. The p re. s
T. Rny 383, 4 Com Journ <!3 Dec. Jn70: Gojark v. U .S., 384 U.S 702, 707 (1965). That reported that Clrc:mlt Judge 'ramm wro lc
Lord's Journ Mny 15, 1791, 2 Woods, 61 8 ." case Involved an Indictment and convi c- that " nn lntrasession adjourn ment o! Con(Ruloo and Manual. p. 665). Rule XIII o! the tion for contemp t o! Congress u n der statute, gresa cloe8 not prevent a. president f rom reSenate's Rule !or Impeachment Trials does a n d the footnote related t o an assertion by turning a bill he disapproves . . . ." (k.'mphanot speak to the I ue. providing that nd- the United Bta.tes that ther~ WIIS a " con- sls a.dded .) In Kenned11 v. Sampson , 3G-l F .
Jourument of the lmpea.chment tnul doe~ not ti n uing 1nv~tlgatlon" by a Hou se commit- Supp 1075 (D.C .D.C .) 1973), the tria l court
nd)ourn the S nate (Rules and Manual, p. t ee of Communl.st acUvltleA In la bor unions .• came to the same eonclu.,lon An d t h e D is140 ) Llkcwl e W11lou hby s stntemen l Is not The Court p ointed out, 1n f ootnote. t h a t trict Judge wrote: "It mus t be kep t In m ind
r n th pont He arg e that dlswlutlon or
t here was no record o! H ouse au t horizat ion that the Supreme Court's language In t11 e
the II ou e by n.1l y to crlnunal proceed- o r suc h a "continu ing 1nvestlgntlon." The Pocket Veto CaJJe applied to an adjournment at th.e end of a se~lon and not to a
In
and the F.ngll 1 practl e ou ht not to Court continued.
1 arge3
term
e tt
(WIIIoughb , supra,
"In a.ny e vent, the authorizat ion of a short recea, durtng a -'63.sion, . . . ( p I 084 )
f 93 ~. p 1151 )
CONCLUSION
' major l nvestl!{ntlon' b y a full Commi t tee
To some "xtcnt the nnswer to the <ines- m ust occ ur during t he term or the Congres.i
It appears beyond argument t ha t t h e r otlon pre uted d<'pcnds upon \l.heU>er the In which the Investigation tal<es place. paelty o! a Conr,rees to a.ct as n lcg l&lal! c
character or U1e S nate when trvlng an 1m- N etth.er t h e House of Representatives n or Its body ends w'hen Congress adjourn•. The Con pea hruen IS eo
ered from that of lcgls- committees are conti nuinq bodies . Cf. Ander- stitution, Art. I , § 1, pro vides: "All ler!l •l••to p vent the application o r son . . •; Mar shall , ••" (EmphMis added )
latl c bod
ti t'P powers herein granted shall be v~ tf'd I n
ell' ~ o
c u ern!
the ('lfect of adjourn- (38 l US. at 707, fn. 4)
a Congre., o! the Unltod States whlrh shnl•
ment Ext tlng pr "edcnt relates to the lat(The Court al~o n oted tha t the House Mns lst of a Senate and !louse oj Repreun t ter. But Willoughby, 11upra asserts (I 932, p. a.dopted It s R u les at t h e begtn n t r~ g of each a tn·e ~.'' (EmphiiSls added.) The provisloHs
1~50) that tho "Senate, when trying imCon gress. The same ree.son could be applied empowering House and SenaWI to function
peachments, sits 1 ot M a lc lslatl\e but M to tne Senat e . The SENATE RULES cited In lmpea.ehment appear In Article I, whi ch
•upra. )
erotabllshes legillatwe powers.
WU ougllby a11 a, gives the figure or
The consl.~tent p a t tern s hown b y con.stltu Without embarking on extensive e'<lrn'twenty
t lonal p rovLslons a.nd Court declslo'1s con- l('gn1 research, one can fairly assert that tile
t'

...-ns ' qunrely raised In
hm.- •• o! Om s Secrctarv o!

u.s C I

th~ 1st Monday
n 11'\hC r~d yt'nr .
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September 23,

197~

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

reeord of oonstlt1.1tlonal con ven l!onal d e ba te to fill-makes very plain to all the final reRbows that lmpea.cb.meut was lnt.<'ndcd as n spons lbillty oi the Seno.te, on !a.cts and on
leg,lsla.tl•e. not judic ia.!, check ou the exccn- la ze." Prof. Black emphasized the word
tlve. (Polltlca.lly speaking, It ls a function '"fina.l"; I added the other emphasis.
of the doctrine of separation of p o wers. )
This language and other ln the same chapWhether the Senate, In conducting trial of ter relates tangentially to another point made
an Impeachment, follows or adopts "judicial" In the memorandum. Prof. Black makes plain
or " !ega.!" ruJes procedure, the proceeding his opinion, based on a rending of the Conitself is, constitutionally speaking, Jegisla- stltutlon and proceedings In the Convention,
tlve.
that the Senate's tria.! of an Impeachment is
Any argument that a Senate s i tting In a legislative (not judicial) function. That
tria l of an impeachment, has a llfe separate issue is critical, you w111 recall, to the quesand dlnstlnct !rom that of the Congress of tion of the power of the Senate to continue
which lt was a. part so that it may continue a trial once begun past the date of adjourntrio.! past adjournment of the Congress .must ment of the Congress of whlch lt was a part.
clear that formidable obs tacle. In the Wright
I conclude by observing that Prof. Black
case cited supra, the Supreme Court posed severa.l times repeats a principle wh1ch he
the question whether "the Congress by their puts this way on page 53 : "The most poweradjournment" prevented the President from ful maxim of constitutional law ls thAt Its
returning the bill which was the subject O\_ rules ought to ma.ke sense."
the dispute. The Court responded:
"'
./
"'The Congress' did not adjourn. The Senate a.lone wa.s In recess. The Constitution
creates and defines 'the Congress.' It consists •or a Senate and House of Representatives.' Art. I, § 1. The Senate is not 'the
Congress.'" (Emphasis added.) 302 U .S. nt
687.)
OTHER REFERENCES

Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment
Power, 65 Nw. U . L. Rev. 719 (1970), does
not contain matter helpful to solution of
1Jlese problems.
Eucutive Impeachment: Stealing Fire
From the Go43, 9 New Eng. L. Rev. 257 ( 1974) ,
Is couta.lned in a bound volume missing from
the library.

Pro!.

Charles Black's book IMPEACH-

MENT: A HANDBOOK (Yale. 1974) , ordered
eome time ago tor Constitutional Law, has
not been received from the publisher.
.ADDENDUM TO MY AUGU5T 23 MEMORAJ\"lH:O M
CONCERNING "llo:PEACHMENT"

As that memorandum noted, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK, by Pro!. Chadles L.
Black, Jr., of Ya.le, had not been received by
its date. I have since rec t'lved lilld read It,
and olfer the followin g com m e nts.
There l.s nothing di rectl y i n the HANDBOOK on the questions raised directl y in the
memorandum. The only utterance even remotely related to the ques tion of Congress's
power to impeach after res ignation appears
In this sentence in Chapter 2, "Procedures":
"It !leems to be optional wl.th the Senate
whether to Impose the nddlt!ona.l penalty of
dil!qual11katlon !rom olflce." (p. 13)
In Chapter 4, entitled " Impeachment and
"Ule Courts," Prof. Black takes a position
markediy opposite suggested by Prof. Berger.
Black's d!.ecussion, as did that or Berger, conoerna the question whether the Supreme
Oourt h8.8 power to review a judgment of conviction In a Senate tria.! of a.n Impeachment.
The preliminary question wh1ch I posed In
the memorandum was dl.iferent: Whether the
Surpeme Court has power to review Congreslllona.J determinations of Its power to impeach, try, and convict after a Pres ident has
resigned. Bla.ck does not treat that question,
but there Is matter In h is answer to his
question which I want t o call to your a ttention.
On page 50 , Prof . Black writes: "So f ar a.
I can find, not one syllable pronounced or
written In or around the time o( the adoption of the Constitution gives the faintest
color to the 5upposltion that the Supreme
Court was expected to have anything to do
with Impeachments, or the trial thereof, or
appea/.8 thereon." (emphasis nddf'd) the emphasized word "anything" Is an overstatement, because his question ls nar rower tba
that, and tt may be that it Is slmllar to judic1a.l dictum which 1s broader than the particular case demands. Nevertheless, when (on
p . 62) Prof. Black seems to be restating hl ~
conclusion, he writes: " ... the wide dl.ifuslon
or thle concept--that the courts haYe 110 rol e
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